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Abstract2 
 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of interest-free and conventional banks in Turky and 6 
MENA countries over the period 2005–2014. To distinguish between interest-free 
and conventional banks [in terms of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit and Insolvency 
risk, and Stability], we use two-sided t-test, linear regression model, Non linear 
Panel model (Random Logit and Pooled Probit), and Discriminant function 
analysis. Using a sample of 115 banks (80 conventional and 35 interest-free 
banks), univariate results based on t-test show that interest-free banks (IB) are, 
on average, less profitable, more liquid, less stable, and have higher credit risk but 
are more solvent, than their conventional peers (CB). We find also that the 
difference between the 2 banking types was significant pre and post the GFC. IB 
are more profitable Pre GFC and more solvent post GFC. Results from linear 
regression models show that the two types of banks may be differentiated in terms 
of, bank characteristic, Size, Cross countries, and Maket Share. Small IB are more 
profitable, more capitalized, and more stable than Small CB (with or without 
islamic window). From the Pooled Probit model (Random Logit) results, banks 
which have more liquidity, which are better capitalized, more solvent, and which 
are less stable (less stable), are more likely to be IB. We find also that there is no 
difference between pre and post the GFC. From Discriminant function analysis, 
AGE was the strongest predictor in discriminating the two types of banks while 
Z-score was the next in importance as a predictor. 
 
JEL classification:  G01 G21 G28 G32 Z12  
Keywords: Financial stability, Profitability, Liquidity, Credit and Insolvency risk, 6 MENA countries 
and Turky, interest-free banking, GFC ,Panel Non linear model (Logit, Probit), Univariate analysis, 
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I. Introduction    
 
Our study investigates the differences between interest-free (islamic) and 
conventional banks in terms of financial characteristics. Four hypothesis will be 
investigated. The first one is about profitability, the second is about liquidity, 
the third is about credit and insolvency risks, and the forth is about stability. This 
paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of interest-free (IB) and conventional banks (CB) using 
a sample of 115 banks (80 conventional and 35 interest-free banks) from Turky 
and 6 MENA countries over the period 2005–2014. 3 Four technic are considered 
to do so. In a first stage, we give an univariate analysis based on t-test statistic. In 
the second stage, we run several linear regressions based on OLS method. And, 
in the third stage, a discrimination analysis based on nonlinear panel model for 
Binary Outcome Data such as Probit and logit model is conducted. In the Forth 
stage, a Discriminant function analysis is conducted. 
 
Our first hypothesis is about bank  profitability.4 We use the return on assets 
(ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) as proxies for bank profitability. These 
two proxies are widely used in the empirical banking literature.5 The main 
empirical results of previous studies showed that IB are more profitable than 
conventional banks (see (Iqbal, 2001); (Olson & Zoubi, 2008); (Abedifar, 
Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, Demirguc -Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013); 
(Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013)).  Hence, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1 : IB are more profitable than CB. 
 
Our second hypothesis is about liquidity. In general, banks face liquidity problem 
due to excess withdrawal from current and savings accounts and bank run. If 
withdrawals significantly exceed new deposits over a short period, then banks get 
into liquidity trouble. Cash ratios measure the bank’sability to meet its short-term 
obligations. Higher ratios denote higher liquidity. Thus, higher liquidity ratios are 
generally associated with less risk. We use liquidity ratios cash to assets ratio, and 
the cash to deposits ratio. (CTA, and CTD), as proxies for liquidity.  
 
                                                 
3 The countries are : Turky, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain , UAE, Quatar, and Jordan. 
4 (Hassoune, 2002) shows that islamic banks (IB) are more profitable than their conventional 
peers.  
5
 The main empirical results of previous studies showed that interest-free banks are more 
profitable than conventional banks. 
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IB does not have enough investment opportunities since it is allowed to invest 
only in Sharia approved projects.6 Therefore, IB are likely to maintain high capital 
buffers to mitigate liquidity risk. Previous empirical studies showed that interest-
free banks maintain higher level of liquidity ratios compared to conventional 
banks (see (Metwally, 1997); (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013)). Hence, we formulate our 
second hypothesis as follows : 
 
H2 : IB hold higher liquidity than CB. 
 
Our third hypothesis is about credit and insolvency risks. Previous empirical 
results suggest that the two groups of banks may be differentiated in terms of risk 
(Metwally, 1997).  
 
Credit risk is the possibility that a borroweror counter party will fail to meet its 
obligations for repayment in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the 
contract. A failure to repay leads to a loss for the creditor and therefore becomes 
a risk for the bank. IB may have lower credit risk compared to conventional banks 
due to the religiosity of clients that enhances loyalty and mitigates default and/or 
due to their special relationship with their depositors (Abedifar, Molyneux, & 
Tarazi, 2013). 
 
Islamic finance requires symmetry of information and transparency in 
transactions since Islam prohibits excessive uncertainty (gharar). Also, gambling 
(maysir) is banned, meaning that excessive risk taking is not permitted. Some 
types of Islamic financial modes based on mark-up (e.g. Murabaha, Ijaras, and 
Istisnaa) require investors to engage in the real economy and hence that a real 
asset underlies the financial transaction. This feature allows the IB to have a 
clearer view on the allocation of its funds and to reduce their exposure to 
speculative behavior. Respect of these principles should decrease the moral 
hazard problems. Therefore, the risk level should be lower for interest-free banks 
than for their conventional peers. 
 
Most empirical studies suggest that IB are less risky  than conventional banks 
(see, (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, Demirguc -Kunt, & 
Merrouche, Islamic vs. conventional banking: business model, efficiency and 
stability, 2013)). However, (Čihák & Hesse, 2010) argue that the more difficult 
access to liquidity put pressures on IB to be more conservative (resulting in less 
moral hazard and risk taking). 
                                                 
6 Interest-free banks also have restricted access to the inter-bank market and the central bank 
(as lender-of-last resort), which challenges liquidity management. 
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We use six indicators : 4 of credit risk [the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross 
loans  (LLR)7 , Non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL), Loans to assets (LTA) 
and Loans to deposits (LTD)]8 and 2 for insolvency risk [Deposits to assets (DTA) 
and Z-score]. All these proxies are widely used in the empirical banking literature 
(see  (Olson & Zoubi, 2008); (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, 
Demirguc -Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013); (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013), (Ben Khediri, 
Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015)). 
 
High debt to assets ratio (DTA) is assumed to be indicator of high leverage and 
therefore higher risk of insolvency. Hence, a low value of DTA implies that the 
bank is more capitalized and so more solvent.  
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
H3 : IB are less risky than CB. 
Our forth hypothesis is about stability. In regard to financial stability, the theory 
and practice of Islamic banking do not give a clear answer concerning whether IB 
should be more or less financially stable than traditional banks. On the one hand, 
the pass-through role and risk-sharing arrangements of IB might be a risk-
reducing factor. Specifically, interest rate risk – well known feature of any risk 
management tool and stress test of conventional bank – should be absent from IB. 
In addition, adverse selection and moral hazard concerns might be reduced in 
interest-free banks if depositors have stronger incentives to monitor and 
discipline. Further, IB can be assumed to be more stable than conventional banks, 
as they are not allowed to participate in risky trading activities. On the other hand, 
the restrictions of IB to certain asset classes, the limited use of hedging 
instruments and the lack of high-quality liquid assets such as Sharia-compliant 
government bonds can increase the riskiness of Sharia-compliant financial 
institutions.  
 
In regard to financial stability, the theory and practice of Islamic banking do not 
give a clear answer concerning whether Islamic banks should be more or less 
financially stable than traditional banks. The first line of argument supporting the 
idea that Islamic banks should be more stable is based on the use of profit/loss 
sharing (PLS) contracts in Islamic banking. This is believed to act as a financial 
buffer to absorb shocks with investment accounts holders so that any shocks to 
the assets of PLS contracts can be absorbed on the liabilities side ( (Bourkhis & 
Nabi, 2013) (Čihák & Hesse, 2010)). 
 
                                                 
7
 As a proxy for credit risk, LLR represents managers’ assessment of the quality of the loan 
portfolio, including performing and non-performing loans. LLR takes into account the past 
performance and the expectation for future performance of the existing loan portfolio. 
8 LTA and LTD are proxy for credit risk exposure. 
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Most empirical studies suggest that interest-free banks are less stable than 
conventional banks. The research employs the Z-score variable for comparison of 
stability between the both types of banking.9 For a review see (Boyd & Runkle, 
1993); (Čihák & Hesse, 2007); (Iwamoto & Mori, 2011); (Laeven & Levine, 
2009); (Lown, Osler, Sufi, & Strahan, 2000); (Maechler, Worrell, & Mitra, 
2007) ; and (Alqahtani & Mayes, 2018).  
 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
H4 : IB are less stable than CB. 
This study proceeds as follows: After a brief introduction (section I) listing the 
hypotheses to be tested in this study, section II give an empirical review. Section 
III describes the data and defines the ratios used in the study. Section IV gives a 
univariate descriptive comparative study between IB and CB based on t-test 
statistic. Section V presents some OLS linear regession model results, while 
Section VI discusses results for non linear Panel model and discrimination 
analysis based on Logit and Probit models (non linear models) and on 
Discriminant function analysis. Section VII concludes. 
II. Empirical Review 
 
All over the world, many countries currently experience a dual banking system 
where Islamic banks operate side by side with conventional banks. In the last two 
decades, the number of Islamic banks significantly increased and their 
geographical spread has grown exponentially to cover all continents. In view of 
the rapid growth of Islamic banking, recent researches have examined and 
compared different aspects (Profitability, efficiency, liquidity, risk, stability, etc.) 
of this new form of banks and conventional ones using financial ratios. 
 
A vast empirical literature compares IB and CB in terms of their financial 
indicators (e.g. (Ahmad & Hassan, 2007); (Awan, 2009); (Bashir, 2003); (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013); (Chowdhury, Haque, & Masih, 2016); 
(Jaffar & Manarvi, 2011); (Kassim & Abdulle, 2012); (Miniaoui & Gohou, 2013); 
(Olson & Zoubi, 2008); (Olson & Zoubi, 2011); and (Parashar & Venkatesh, 
2010). 
However, empirical studies investigating the financial stability of IB are still 
limited (see (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, Demirguc -Kunt, & 
Merrouche, 2013); (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013); (Čihák & Hesse, 2010); (Rajhi & 
                                                 
9 The higher the Z-score is the lower is the bank's default risk. 
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Hassairi, 2013),  (Alqahtani & Mayes, 2018)).10 Taking size into account and 
regarding the impact of the GFC (Global Financial Crisis), the results indicate that 
large commercial banks tend to be more stable than large IB  and small IB are 
more stable than small commercial banks (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010), and  (Alqahtani & Mayes, 2018)). 11 
 
Other literature compares interest-free and conventional banks in the question of 
operational efficiency (e.g. (Abdul-Majid, Saal, & Battisti, 2010); (Bader, 
Mohamad, Ariff, & Hassan, 2007); (Brown, Hassan, & Skully, 2007); (Rosman, 
Wahab, & Zainol, 2013); (Srairi, 2010); (Sufian, 2007); (Yahya, Muhammad, & 
Hadi, 2012)). 
 
In addition some previous studies reveal that Islamic banks hold more capital 
than conventional banks. In fact, (Olson & Zoubi, 2008) show that liabilities to 
shareholder’s capital ratio are significantly smaller at Islamic banks in GCC 
countries. (Metwally, 1997) shows also that total capital to asset ratio is a good 
discriminator between Islamic and conventional banks.12 (Iqbal, 2001) argues also 
that capital to asset ratio is higher for Islamic banks.13  
 
The present study contributes to the ongoing debate by conducting a formal 
empirical analysis, taking account of a range of considerations that to the best of 
our knowledge have not been considered by prior studies for Turky and MENA 
zone.  
III. Data Analysis  
 
We use banks from the MENA region and Turkey over the period 2005–2014 
covering the 2008 GFC. We use a sample that comprises only countries with both 
conventional and interest-free banks. Bank-level data is collected from the 
Bankscope database. We also double check the categorization of IB in Bankscope 
with information from Islamic Banking Associations and country-specific 
sources. 14 The sample includes 80 CB and 35 IB operating in seven different 
                                                 
10 In short, without taking size into account, (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013) ; (Čihák & Hesse, 2010); 
and (Rajhi & Hassairi, 2013) find IB are more financially stable than CB, whereas ; (Beck, 
Demirguc -Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013) find the opposite. 
11
 For more details on empirical review see Table A 2 in Annexe. 
12  Metwally (1997) suggests that the lower is total deposits to assets ratio, the more likelihood 
that the bank is an Islamic one. He suggests also that the higher is the capital to asset ratio, the 
higher the probability that the bank is an Islamic one. 
13
  (Samad & Hassan, 2000) reveal that Islamic banks have lower debt to asset ratio compared 
to conventional banks in Malaysia.  
14 We remplace outliers in all variables by means within each country. 
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countries (Turky, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and 
Jordan), consisting of  996 bank-year observations.  
 
Table 1 lists the number of CB and IB and observations in each country. Bank list 
by country is given at Table A 1 in Annexe. 
 
In this paper, fourteen financial ratios have been considered. In Table 2, we 
classify these ratios into five groups: profitability ratios (ROA, and ROE), 
liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD), credit risk (LLR, NPL, LTA, LTD), 
insolvency risk (DTA), and asset structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA). Regarding the 
later ratios, we use fixed assets to assets ratio, and off-balance sheet items to assets 
ratio to account for the operating leverage, and off-balance sheet activities, 
respectively.15  
 
We use the Z-score as measure of bank stability; this indicates the distance from 
insolvency, combining accounting measures of profitability, leverage and 
volatility, which has been widely used in the literature [see for example (Laeven 
& Levine, 2009), (Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010), etc].16 Z-score indicates the 
multiple of a bank's equity buffer before it falls into the state of default. In this 
sense, the higher the Z-score the lower is the bank's default risk. 
 
We present descriptive statistics (average value for conventional and interest-
free banks for each variable, number of observation, as well as standard deviation) 
at Table A 3 (see Appendice A). In first stage, we compare volatilities. Z-score 
and FAA are more volatil for Conventional Banks, while CAP, ROA, CTD, and 
LTD are more volatil for IB.  
 
In second stage, in order to investigate the evolving behavior of all banks, we do 
an univariate analysis over the pre-crisis period (2005–2008) and the post-crisis 
period (2009–2015). In Table 3 and  Figure 1, we compaire means for all 
variables Pre and Post GFC.  
 
Concerning the profitability, the mean values of ROA and ROE of all banks Pre 
GFC are 2.4% and 13.61%, respectively, while the corresponding figures for all 
banks Post GFC are 1.05% and 9.69%. The differences between the two periods 
are statistically significant. In terms of evolution, there is slight decrease in 
                                                 
15 These ratios are used in the previous empirical banking literature (see (Pasiouras & 
Kosmidou, 2007), (Srairi, 2010), and (Ben Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015). 
16
 The variable Z-score can be calculated as Z-score ijt = ROAijt+(EQ/TA)ijtσROA    , for bank i, country j, 
in year t, where ROA is the standard measure of return on asset, Equity to Assets ratio 
(ETA= EQ/TA), and σROA is the fluctuation of ROA indicated by the standard deviation. 
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profitability for all banks. This is a clear indication that the financial crisis has a 
negative impact on the profitability for all banks.  
 
Second, evidence shows that the liquidity of all banks, measured by either cash 
to assets ratio (CTA) or cash to deposits ratio (CTD), is statistically different 
during the two periods (before and after GFC). The mean values of CTA and CTD 
of all banks Pre GFC are 5.6% and 9.25%, respectively, while the corresponding 
values Post GFC are 7.5% and 26.89%. The differences between the two periods 
are statistically significant (at 1% and 10% level respectively). In terms of 
evolution, there is an increase in cash holdings after the crisis for all banks.  
 
Third, regarding the asset quality, as measured by loans to assets ratio (LTA), 
loans to deposits ratio (LTD), and non-performing loans to loans ratio (NLP), we 
do not find any significant differences Pre and Post the financial crisis for LTD. 
While for LTA and NPL differences Pre and Post GFC are significant (at 5% 
level).  In terms of evolution, there is an increase in credit risk. 
However, in respect to loans loss reserves to loans ratio (LLR), the difference Pre 
and Post GFC is statistically significant at 10% level, indicating that all banks 
have more credit risk after the crisis. Regarding the insolvency risk, evidence 
shows that leverage, as measured by debt to assets ratio (DTA), there is no 
difference for overall periods even at 10% level. Moreover, all banks are better 
capitalized (CAP) after crisis. CAP is bigger but difference is not significant. The 
Z-score mean value is lower Post GFC but difference with pre GFC mean value 
is not significant for all banks. Finally, regarding the asset structure, evidence 
shows that all banks have, on average, lower off-balance sheet items to assets 
ratio (OBSIA), bigger Size, and higher fixed assets to assets ratio (FAA) after 
the GFC. However, FAA is bigger Post GFC but difference is not significant. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of means for all variables Pre and Post GFC.  
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Table 1: Sample description (Turkey & MENA) :17 
Code Country IB 
   
CB IB (%) 
  
No 
bank 
No 
obs 
  No 
bank 
No 
obs 
 
1 Turky 4 35   17 155 19.05 
2 Egypte 2 12   15 118 11.76 
3 Tunisia 2 20   14 121 12.5 
4 Bahreïn 16 135   7 66 69.57 
5 UAE 4 44    11 92  33.33  
6 Qatar 3 24   6 58 33.33 
7 Jordan 3 22   10 94 23.08 
 Total 35 292   80 704 30.43 
 
Table 2: Definition of variables. 
Ratios Definitions  
 
Profitability  
 
ROA Return on assets = Net income/Total assets 
ROE Return on equity = Net income/Stockholders’ equity 
Liquidity  
CTA Cash to assets = Cash/Total assets 
CTD Cash to deposits = Cash/Total customer deposits 
Credit risk  
LLR Loans loss reserves to gross loans 
NPL Non-performing loans to gross loans 
LTA Loans to assets = Loans/Total assets 
LTD Loans to deposits = Loans/Total customer deposits 
Insolvency risk   
DTA Deposits to assets = Deposits/Total assets 
Asset structure  
FAA Fixed assets to assets = Fixed assets/Total assets 
OBSIA Off-balance sheet items to assets = Off-balance sheet items/Total assets 
 
 
Table 3: Univariate Analysis, comparison of means Pre and Post crisis for all banks. 
 2005-2014 2005-2007 2008-2014 Differenc
e t-test 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean p-value 
Zscore 996 21.2469 298 21.97839 698 20.9346 0.4250 
CAP 1,005 .1781033 300 .1726107 705 .1804406 0.5626 
ROA 1,002 .0145563 300 .0240201 702 .0105119 0.0110 
ROE 995 .1086696 298 .1360589 697 .0969594 0.0233 
NPL 679 .0717421 229 .0564999 450 .0794986 0.0258 
CTA 1,002 .0693615 298 .0560346 704 .0750027 0.0016 
CTD 855 .2107176 282 .0924885 573 .2689036 0.0761 
                                                 
17 MENA: Middle East and North Africa. Source : Bankscope. 
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LLR 803 .0643819 290 .0562836 513 .0689598 0.0706 
LTA 907 .4941354 327 .4608932 580 .5128772 0.0153 
LTD 869 .8491909 313 .8619567 556 .8420044 0.6643 
DTA 970 .1178643 289 .1208797 681 .1165846 0.7192 
FAA 989 .0223785 305 .015441 684 .025472 0.5431 
OBSIA 895 .2349003 272 .2737671 623 .2179312 0.0010 
Size 1,006 3.111136 299 2.957979 707 3.175908 0.0372 
Notes: This table reports the mean of financial ratios for all banks, and the p-value for the t-test of 
differences in means between the two periods.  
IV. Univariate analysis : comparing CB and IB banks  
A. For overall period  
 
At Table 4, we present mean for each variable for all banks, average value for 
conventional and IB as well as the p-value of a two-sided t-test. The univariate 
analysis shows that IB are significantly different from conventional banks at 5% 
level with respect to the most variables used in this study, see Table 4. The 
profitability, as measured by the ROE, is higher for conventional banks than for 
interest-free peers. The ROE of 12.8% for conventional banks versus 6.08% for 
IB is significantly larger at the 5% level. This finding is not in line with the first 
hypothesis (H1). However, when we use the ROA as proxy of profitability, we do 
not find any significant difference between IB and CB.18 
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, when the differences in liquidity between IB 
and CB are significant, interest-free banks are more liquid. We find that IB hold 
more cash to deposits, CTD averages 46.1% for IB versus 13.1% for conventional 
banks. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result 
corroborates the second hypothesis (H2). But in terms of cash to assets (CTA), it 
does not seem that the two types of banks are different. CTA averages 6.5 % for 
IB versus 7.1% for conventional banks. The difference is not statistically 
significant even at the 10% level.  
 
Regarding the credit risk exposure, the average loans to assets ratio (LTA) of IB 
stands at 47.38% versus 50.25% for CB and the average loans to deposits ratio 
(LTD) for the two bank types are 98.66% and 79.73%, respectively. The 
difference is statistically significant only for the LTD ratio at 1% level.19  
Regarding the third hypothesis, when the differences in insolvency risk, in term 
                                                 
18 (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013) argue that the religious depositors may be more loyal 
and prepared to take lower returns, refusing from withdrawing deposits even if the performance 
of the bank deteriorates. Therefore, the IB’s profitability is less volatile than that of the 
conventional one. 
19
 These results show that IB intermediate more of the deposits they receive and engage more 
in financing economic activity via lending compared to conventional banks. 
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of dept to asset ratio (DTA), between IB and CB are significant,  IB have lower 
average (8.9%) than conventional bank (12.8%). This implies that the interest-
free bank is more capitalized and so more solvent. We also consider the 
importance of stability. The pairwise analysis suggests that overall, conventional 
banks are on average significantly more stable as indicated by Z-scores, and also 
have a lower probability of default than IB over the entire period.20  
Interest-free bank are then less profitable, less stable, more liquid, have 
higher credit risk but are more solvent than conventional banks. 
 
Table 4 :  Comparison of means between CB vs IB : Descriptive statistics for both types of 
banks, with p-values for Student t statistic. 
Variable ALL CB IB 
Difference t-
test p-value 
Zscore 21,2469 24,56965 12,83398           0.0000 
Capital adequaty ratio CAP    0,1781033 0,1258643 0,3113774 0.0000 
Return on assets ROA    0,0145563 0,0148787 0,0137452 0.8338 
Return on equity ROE 0,1086696 0,1276067 0,0607897 0.0001 
Cash to assets CTA 0,0693615 0,071153 0,0648099 0.2998 
Cash to deposits CTD 0,2107176 0,130259 0,4609902 0.0024 
Non-performing loans to gross loans NPL 0,0717421 0,071239 0,0730088 0.8703 
Loans loss reserves to gross loans LLR 0,0643819 0,0660568 0,0602344 
                    
0.4342 
Loans to assets LTA 0,4941354 0,5025245 0,4738117 0.2052 
Loans to deposits LTD 0,8491909 0,7973383 0,9866655 0.0001 
Debt to assets DTA 0,1178643 0,1281966 0,0895002 0.0017 
Fixed assets to assets FAA 0,0223785 0,0252381 0,0151735 0.5513 
Off-balance sheet items to assets OBSIA 0,2349003 0,2521895 0,1940171 0.0006 
Size 3,111136 3,119207 3,090518 
                    
0.7875 
 
Note : Two sided p-value.  
 
B. For post and pre GFC 
 
Again, in order to investigate the evolving behavior of IB and CB and to test the 
sensitivity of our results, we repeat the univariate analysis over the pre-crisis 
period (2005–2008) and the post-crisis period (2009–2015). Table 5 reports 
comparison of means for all ratios Pre (Panel A) and Post (Panel B)  Global 
Finance crisis (GFC) beween IB and CB. Based on the evolution of the ROA 
(and ROE), we conclude that the IB outperform the conventional banks before 
(and post) the financial crisis. The Z-score and OBSIA evolution are lower for 
                                                 
20
 These findings are in line with those of (Beck, Demirguc -Kunt, & Merrouche, Islamic vs. 
conventional banking: business model, efficiency and stability, 2013) and (Alqahtani & Mayes, 
2018) but contradict previous evidence of (Čihák & Hesse, 2010) and (Rajhi & Hassairi, 2013). 
 
12 
 
IB pre and post GFC with significant difference. But FFA evolution are lower for 
IB only pre GFC with significant difference. Evidence shows that the liquidity 
(Capital adequaty) of IB, measured by cash to deposits ratio CTD (CAP), is 
statistically higher during the two periods (before and after GFC). Regarding the 
insolvency risk (credit rik), evidence shows that leverage as measured by debt to 
assets ratio DTA (asset quality measured by LTD) is lower (higher) for interest-
free banks for only post (pre) GFC periods.  
13 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables (average values) and Difference t-test 
 
Panel A : Pre-crisis period 2005-2007 
 
Panel B : Post-crisis period 2008-2014 
 
Obs CB CB Obs IB IB 
Differenc
e t-test p-
value 
 
Obs_CB CB Obs_IB IB 
Differenc
e t-test p-
value 
Zscore 222 25.05958 76 12.97805 0.0000 Zscore 492 24.34858 206 12.78082 0.0000 
CAP 223 .130612 77 .2942432 0.0000 CAP 499 .1237425 206 .317782 0.0000 
ROA 222 .0160953 78 .0465755 0.0000 ROA 495 .0143331 207 .0013744 0.0652 
ROE 222 .1298856 76 .1540914 0.2769 ROE 491 .1265763 206 .0263677 0.0000 
NPL 159 .0522647 70 .06612 0.3775 NPL 327 .0804651 123 .0769293 0.8047 
CTA 221 .0579152 77 .0506372 0.5539 CTA 498 .0770276 206 .0701075 0.3209 
CTD 213 .0740567 69 .1493868 0.0069 CTD 434 .1578422 139 .615671 0.0046 
LLR 203 .0573145 87 .053878 0.7420 LLR 369 .0708662 144 .0640747 0.5001 
LTA 226 .4687335 101 .4433497 0.3954 LTA 416 .5208821 164 .4925719 0.3651 
LTD 223 .78645 90 1.049046 0.0067 LTD 408 .8032896 148 .9487318 0.0073 
DTA 221 .1218992 68 .1175665 0.8269 DTA 490 .1310369 191 .0795081 0.0008 
FAA 219 .0170884 86 .0112458 0.0150 FAA 489 .028888 195 .0169058 0.6231 
OBSIA 193 .2953927 79 .2209349 0.0125 OBSIA 436 .2330652 187 .1826455 0.0143 
Size 222 2.962104 77 2.946085 0.9304 Size 501 3.188821 206 3.144505 0.7328 
 
Notes: This table reports the mean of financial ratios for IB and CB, and the p-value for the t-test of differences in means between the two groups 
of banks.  
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V. Regression analysis: Comparing IB, WB and CB 
 
Using univariate analyisis, there is significant evidence that banks are less 
profitable, more liquid, riskier, and less stable post GFC. Compaired to 
conventional banks, interest-free banks are riskier and less stable, but have a 
higher liquidity, and are less profitable. This is true also for pre GFC as well as 
for post GFC. While univariate comparisons show significant differences between 
IB and CB, these differences could be driven by other bank and/or country 
characteristics. This is to be done within regression estimation. Different 
regression models are considered in this section. First, we Compare interest-free 
and CB controlling for bank characteristics. Second, we Compare IB and CB 
cross different Size groups. Third, we do analyse cross countries difference. 
Forth, we take account of Market share side for each type of banks.   
 
All the variables under the study must be stationary otherwise spurious 
regression may be found. Henceforth, Levin, Lin & Chu, ADF - Fisher Chi-
square, and PP - Fisher Chi-square Unit Root Tests for PANEL data have been 
implemented to ensure that all the bank specific variables in the regression 
equation are stationary.21 The result is shown in Table A 8: Panel A for all banks 
(see Appendice A). All considered bank caracteristic variables are stationary 
except OBSIA and Size. Five of Bank specific variables are not stationary : Z-
score, NPL, LLR, DTA, and CAP. 22  A trend variable will then be added in 
regressions for non stationary variables. Focusing on a sample of countries with 
both types of banks allows us to control for unobserved time-variant country-
specific effects by introducing country-year dummies, thus a clearer 
identification of such differences than when comparing banks from different 
countries.  
 
C.  Controlling for bank characteristics 
 
While univariate comparisons show significant differences between IB and CB, 
these differences could be driven by other bank characteristics. To assess 
differences in Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and stability across 
different bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 
 
                                                 
21 For a discussion on the choice of adequate test see Appendice B. Hence, for our case, none of reported 
sample conditons in Table B1 is true. Results depend also on stability hypothesis of considered series. 
Looking at time series plot (by country) for each variable (not reported in this paper for space constraint), 
instability can be present at date indicated at Table A 8. So these results are not accurate. We have rather 
to apply unit root test which take account of possible structural change in considered series.    
22 Panel B for Conventional banks, and Panel C for IB. 
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𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝜶 𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 is vector of Bank caracteristics,  𝑋𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡, 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡, OBSIA𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡)’, 
where 
Age = Number of years since the bank was incorporated, 
Size = Log(Total asset), 
Growth = Log(Total assets) - Log(Total assets
-1 ), 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i, for country j, in year t, 𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 are country-year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐶𝐵𝑖  is a dummy 
taking the value one for conventional bank, 𝑊𝐵𝑖  is a dummy taking the value 
mines one for conventional bank with islamic window (IW), 𝐷2008 is a dummy 
variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error 
term. We thus compare IB and CB with or without IW.  
 
The results in Table A 4 show that within countries and years, IB have higher 
Cash to deposits (CTD) and higher CTA, higher Loans to deposits (LTD), higher 
LTA and NPL, higher Capital adequaty ratio (CAP), lower Debt to assets (DTA), 
and lower Z-score than conventional banks (with or without IW). IB show then 
higher liquidity and credit risk, are more capitalized and more solvent, and 
have lower stability.  The magnitude of these differences is also meaningful, with 
IB having a 39.9% point higher Cash to deposits, 27.8% point higher Loans to 
deposits (LTD), 7.8% points higher CAP, 5.13% points lower Debt to assets 
(DTA), and a 485.12% point lower Z-score. Table A 4 is summed up at Table 6. 
Also from these Tables, we can say that conventional banks without IW have 
lower liquidity (20.13%), lower credit risk (LTA) and NPL, and higher Debt to 
assets (DTA), CAP, and Z-score than IB and WB. 
 
Table 6: Significant factors for IB and CB: Controlling for bank characteristics (Equation(1)). 
 
Capitalisation Profitability Liquidity Credit risk Insolvency Stability 
IB +  +  +  - 
 
- - 
CB +  - -    - 
 
+ + 
Note : For credit risk, signs are given respectively for LTA, LTD, LLR, and NPL. In this Table 
results of Profitability is measured by ROA and ROE, Liquidity is measured by CTA and CTD, 
Insolvency is measured by DTA, and instability is measured by Z-score. . Empty cells suggest 
that the determinant was not significant. 
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D. Cross different Size groups 
 
Here we split the sample of all banks according to their asset Size. Specifically, 
we split the sample into banks above the 50th percentile (Large banks) and banks 
below the 50th percentile (Small banks). 23 
 
Taking into account differences in Size, we use additional specifications, 
including interacting the IB dummy with Size dummies. We allow for clustering 
of the error terms on the bank level, i.e. correlation among the error terms across 
years within banks. We therefore run the following regressions: 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛼 𝐿𝑊𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿 𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2) 
Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, 
Insolvency, and stability of bank i, for country j, in year t, 𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡  are country-year-
fixed effects, 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑖 (𝑆𝐼𝐵𝑖) is an Inetraction term between large bank and IB (a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if IB is large (Small), 0 otherwise),  𝐿𝑊𝐵𝑖 (𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖  ) is 
an Inetraction term between large bank and conventional bank with window (a 
dummy variable equal to -1 if conventional  bank with IW is large (Small), 0 
otherwise) , 𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑖  (𝐵𝐶𝐵𝑖) is an Inetraction term between large bank and 
conventional bank without window (a dummy variable equal to 1 if conventional  
bank without IW is large (Small), 0 otherwise), 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for 
GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term. We thus 
compare IB and CB with or without IW.  
 
The results in Table A 5 show that small IB have higher Return on equity (5.8% 
ROE), higher LTA (9.9%), higher Capital adequaty ratio (4.4% CAP), and higher 
Z-score (6.5%) than Small conventional banks (with or without IW).  While 
Small conventional banks have higher LTD (31.27%), higher LTA (16.3%), 
lower Z-score (-14.99%), higher CAP (10.45%), and lower ROE (-5.3%) than 
small IB and small WB.   
 
Table A 5 is summed up at Table 7. As shown from Table 7, there are significant 
differences between IB and CB of different Sizes and that many of the findings 
so far on differences between IB and CB are driven by smaller IB. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Large Bank = Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank is large (size > median), 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7: Significant factors for IB, WB, and CB : Cross different Size groups (Equation(2)). 
 
Capitalisation Profitability Liquidity Credit risk Insolvency Stability 
LIB 
- -  -    
 
 - 
LWB + - -     + - +  + 
 
  
LCB 
- +       + - -  - 
 
 + 
D2008 + - +      + +             +    +   
Note : For credit risk, signs are given respectively for LTA, LTD, LLR, and NPL. In this Table 
results of Profitability is measured by ROA and ROE, Liquidity is measured by CTA and CTD, 
Insolvency is measured by DTA, and instability is measured by Z-score. Empty cells suggest 
that the determinant was not significant. 
 
E. Cross countries 
 
To controll for country caracteristic in assessing the differences across different 
bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗  𝑪𝒋𝑰𝑩𝒊𝑗 + 𝜋 𝐷2008 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗𝑡𝑪𝒋𝒀𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  (3) 
where X is vector of Bank caracteristics,  𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, OBSIA𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), 
 
where AGE𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 is the Number of years since the bank was incorporated, Size𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 = 
Log(Total Asset), Growth𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 = Log(Total Assets/Total Assets-1), 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is one of 
our measures (of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and stability ) of 
bank i, for country j, in year t, 𝐶𝑗 is indicator vriable for country j = 1, …, 7, IB 
is dummy variable equal to 1 if bank i is islamic and zero otherwise, 𝒀𝒕 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for year t and zero if not,  𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 are country-year-fixed 
effects,   𝐶𝑗𝐼𝐵𝑖   is a country-IB indicator, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC 
(taking the value one from year > 2008), 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is for non stationary dependent 
variable, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term. We thus compare IB and CB. OLS results of 
regression (3) for each group of considered measures are given at Table A 6. 
Table A 6 presents results using regression Equation (3) where we interact the IB 
dummy with country dummies to explore whether the differences between 
conventional and IB vary across our 7 countries. As we interact the IB dummy 
with all 7 country dummies, we drop the IB dummy itself. In addition, the 
interaction term with country-year dummy is not reported for all variables as the 
number of interactions is large. The results in Table A 6 show a large cross-
country variation in the differences between IB and CB. Take the example of 
profitability; IB are less profitable than conventional banks in Egypt (-1.3%) and 
18 
 
Turky (-1.1%), while in Tunisia IB have more ROA(0.9%).24 There is a large 
variation in the differences between IB and CB in credit risk across our sample 
countries, with riskier IB (having higher LTA in Turky (10.8%) and Jordan 
(11.1%), more LTD in Egypt (10.4%), UAE (37.2%), Quatar (27.4%), and Jordan 
(183.8%), more LLR (10.2%) and NPL (19.4%) in Egypt).25 The difference in 
liquidity (CTA) between IB and CB again varies across countries; though IB 
show higher liquidity in Turky (4.9%), and lower liquidity in Quatar (-2.3%). The 
differences are not significant for other countries. Where the differences in 
stability (Z-scores) between IB and CB are significant. IB are less stable, with he 
exception of Turkey, Bahrain, and UAE where they are significantly more stable. 
The differences in insolvency (DTA) between IB and CB are significant in 4 
countries. On the other hand, IB are better capitalized (CAP) than conventional 
banks in Bahrain (27.9%) and Quatar (2.8%), with an opposite case for Egypt (-
4.7%) and Turkey (-5.2%) where IB are significantly less capitalized than 
conventional banks. The positive (negative) and significant coefficient on the IB 
dummy post GFC is true in the CTA, CAP, DTA, and Z-score (ROE and LTA) 
regressions. All these results are summed up in Table 8 here after. As it is clear 
from Table 8, and in accordance with univarite results, Negative Profitability is 
driven by Egyptian and Turkish IB, Liquidity is driven by Turkish IB, Instability 
is driven by Egyptian, Tunisian, Quatarian and Jordanian IB, while credit risk is 
driven by all IB except Tunisian IB which are more profitable. Solvency of IB is 
driven by Turkish, Egyptian, Tunisian, and Bahreïnien IB. 
 
 
Table 8 : Significant factors for IB by country (Equation(1)). 
Country Profitability Liquidity Credit risk Insolvency Stability 
1 Turky - + + - -  
 
-  
2 Egypte -   + + + 
 
- - 
3 Tunisia +  -   - 
 
- - 
4 Bahreïn    + - - 
 
-  
5 UAE    +  - 
 
  
6 Qatar  -  +  - 
 
 - 
7 Jordan   + + -  
 
 - 
Note : For credit risk, signs are given respectively for LTA, LTD, LLR, and NPL. In this Table 
results of Profitability is measured by ROA, Liquidity is measured by CTA, Insolvency is 
measured by DTA, and instability is measured by Z-score. Empty cells suggest that the 
determinant was not significant. 
 
In the following section, we therefore explore whether some of these cross-
country differences are driven by different market shares of interest-free banks. 
                                                 
24
  Table A 6  results suggest that IB in Egypt and Turky have lower ROA. 
25 While having lower LTA in Tunisia, lower LTD in Turky, lower LLR in Turky, Bahrain, and Jordan, 
and less NPL in Tunisia, Bahrain, UAE, and Quatar. 
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F. Market share 
 
Taking into account differences in Market share,26 we use additional 
specifications, including interacting the IB dummy with Market share variable. 
We therefore run the following regression: 27  𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4) 
where  𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵 = Market share * IB, 
Market share = Bank total assets /Country banks total assets * 100%, 𝐼𝐵𝑖  is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 are country-
year-fixed effects, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one 
from year > 2008), 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is for non stationary dependent variable, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is 
an error term. 
Then, we split the sample all banks according to their Market share. Specifically, 
we split the sample into banks above the 50th percentile (high Market share 
banks) and banks below the 50th percentile (Low Market share banks). We use 
additional specifications, including interacting the IB dummy with high Market 
share dummy. We therefore run the following regression : 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜇 + β 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿 𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐶𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑌𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 (5) 
Where 
HShare = 1 if Share ≥ Median market share = 0.0528857 HShareCB = HShare * CB HShareIB = HShare * IB 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑗,,𝑡), 
and 𝐶𝐵𝑖  is a dummy taking the value one for conventional bank,  𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵𝑖 is 
an Inetraction term between high Market share bank and IB (a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if IB has high Market share, 0 otherwise),  𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐶𝐵𝑖 is an Inetraction 
term between high Market share bank and conventional bank (a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if conventional  bank has high Market share, 0 otherwise), 𝐷2008 is a 
dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is for 
non stationary dependent variable, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term. We thus compare 
high Market share IB and high Market share CB. OLS results of regressions (4) 
                                                 
26
 Market share is the percentage of comparison between banks total asset and banks (see 
(Purboastuti, Anwar, & Suryahani, 2015) and (Aminah, Soewito, & Khairudin, 2019)). 
27 We allow for clustering of the error terms on the bank level, i.e. correlation among the error 
terms across years within banks. We prefer to cluster on the bank- rather than country-level, as 
some of the countries in our sample host significantly more banks than others and we have only 
7 countries. 
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and (5) for each group of considered measures are given at Table A 7 respectively 
in Panel A and Panel B.  
The results in Table A 7 show significant variation in the differences between 
conventional and IB across countries and years with different market shares of 
IB.28 In Panel A (equation (4)), we introduce an interaction term between the 
market share of banks and the IB dummy. We also include country-year dummies 
and the IB dummy. In Panel B (equation (5)), we replace the IB dummy with 
two interaction terms of the bank dummy with dummies indicating country-year 
pairs with the IB share above the median market share of IB and the CB share 
above the median market share of conventional banks. While the Panel A results 
allow us to gauge the continuous variation of differences between IB and CB with 
different market shares of IB, Panel B allows us a direct comparison between 
countries and years with high market shares of IB and with high market shares of 
CB. Results of Table A 7 are summed up at Table 9.  
The Panel A regressions results of Table 9 show that IB have relatively higher 
liquidity ratios (20.7%) and lower credit risk (-21.6% in NPL) than conventional 
banks in countries and years with higher market share of IB. While IB have 
higher capitalisation (16.2%) and credit risk (4.7% in LTA and 18.6% in LTD) 
than CB. We continue to find that IB have lower stability (- 4940.0%) but lower 
capitalisation (-121.5%) than conventional banks in countries and years with 
higher market share of IB (although these differences do not vary significantly 
with IB). We continue to find also that IB have less profitability ratios (- 4.5%) 
and are more solvent (- 9.3%) than CB.   
The Panel B results suggest that the higher liquidity of IB visa- vis conventional 
banks is driven by markets with higher market shares of IB. We also find that IB 
that are more solvent and are less stable (- 30.4% and - 65.5% respectively) in 
markets with above-median IB market shares, as the IB dummy enters 
significantly for these markets and is significantly lower than the IB dummy in 
markets with higher median IB market share (- 9.3% and - 4.3% respectively). 
While the lower credit risk ratio holds only for IB in markets with higher median 
IB market shares.  
 
In summary, some of the cross-country variation in the differences between IB 
and CB (specially for insolvency and stability), established in Table 8, can be 
explained with differences in market shares for interest-free banks. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 One of the reasons why we observe the large cross-country variation in differences between 
conventional and IB might be different relative market shares of conventional and IB. Higher market 
shares for IB might indicate more established Sharia-compliant finance with repercussions for 
efficiency and regulatory approach but also for competitive responses by conventional banks. 
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 Table 9 : Significant factors Comparing interest-free and conventional banks – controlling for 
market shares. 
Panel A : Equation (4) 
 
Capitalisation Profitability Liquidity Credit risk Insolvency Stability 
IB + - + + +   
 
- - 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑰𝑩
-  +    - 
 
 - 
Panel B : Equation (5) 
 
Capitalisation Profitability Liquidity Credit risk Insolvency Stability 𝑯𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑰𝑩 
  +    - 
 
- - 𝑯𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑪𝑩 +     - - 
 
+ + 
Note : For credit risk, signs are given respectively for LTA, LTD, LLR, and NPL. In this Table 
results of Liquidity is measured by CTA, Insolvency is measured by DTA, and instability is 
measured by Z-score. . Empty cells suggest that the determinant was not significant. 
  
VI. Discrimination study between IB and CB  
 
We consider a binary outcome in which 𝑌𝑖𝑡 takes only the values 0 and 1. The 
dependent variable to be predicted is a categorical variable taking on the value of 
one for an Islamic bank and zero for a conventional bank ; 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  1 if Bank i is IB and zero if not 
 Parametric model to consider is then the Panel probit or Panel Logit (non linear) 
regression. These models suppose that the probability of dichotomous outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is related to a set of potential predictor variables X in the forms:29 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 /𝑋) = {Ф(𝛽𝑖0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝛬(𝛽𝑖0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡)  (6) 
where Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution fonction (cdf) for Probit 
model, and  Λ(z) = exp (𝑧)1+exp (𝑧)  (7) 
is the logistic cdf for Logit model,30 𝑃𝑖 is the probability of the outcome of interest, 𝛽𝑖0 is the intercept term (individual-specific effect), 𝛽𝑘 for k ∈ (1, . . ., K) 
                                                 
29 The dependent variable in equation (7) is the logarithm of two probabilities of the outcome 
of interest. These variables are usually selected for inclusion by using some form of backward 
or forward stepwise regression technique (Pampel, 2000). 
30
  Or 𝑃𝑖 = 11+exp −(𝛽𝑖0+  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ). Logit model is considered in (Toumi, Viviani, & Belkacem, 
2010) for a panel of 545 observations with 250 of these observations being for  Islamic banks, 
from 18 countries over the period 2004-2008. They show that the lower the size and the lower 
debt to asset ratio, the more the probability that the bank operate under Islamic principles. 
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represents the real coefficient associated with the  corresponding explanatory 
variable 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡. 31  
 
The assumption that 𝛽𝑖0 is unrelated to 𝑋𝑖𝑡 produces the random effects model 
so that the conditional distribution f (𝛽𝑖0| 𝑋𝑖𝑡) is independent of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . The random 
effects Model assumes that the individual effects are normally distributed, with 𝛽𝑖0∼N(0, 𝜎𝛽2).32 If that distribution is unrestricted, so that 𝛽𝑖0 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 may be 
correlated, then we have what is called the fixed  effects model (Greene, 2012, p. 
716). 
 
It is useful to consider the pooled model that results if we simply ignore the 
heterogeneity, 𝛽𝑖0. If individual-specific effect are not present, then an alternative 
to the random effects model is a pooled binary model that simply specifies that :33  𝑃(𝑌it = 1 /X) = 𝐹( 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽) 
where F ≡ Ф for Probit model and Λ for logit one.  
 
If the fixed effects model is appropriate, the pooled MLE that ignores fixed effects 
will be inconsistent. Ignoring the random effects in a pooled model produces an 
attenuated (inconsistent-downward biased) estimate of β. The fixed effects model 
encounters an incidental parameters problem that renders the maximum 
likelihood estimator inconsistent (Greene, 2012, p. 717). So, in this paper only 
Pooled and random effect models will be estimated.34 
 
The classification results of logistic regression are sensitive to high correlation 
between the explanatory variables. Hence, because of the problem of 
multicolinearity, we excluded some of the explanatory variables. Only 8 predictor 
variables out of 12 will be considered. The Pearson correlation coefficients are 
                                                 
31 For binary data the conditional probability is also the conditional mean. 
32
 Random effects estimation is more commonly used because of inconsistency of the fixed 
effects estimator. 𝜎𝛽2 = 𝜌1−𝜌 , 𝜌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝛽𝑖0, 𝛽𝑗0). 
33
 Fixed effects estimation is possible for the panel logit model, using the conditional MLE, but 
not for other binary panel models such as panel probit.  
34
 The problems with the fixed effects estimator are statistical. The estimator relies on T 
increasing for the constant terms to be consistent-in essence, each 𝛽𝑖0 is estimated with T 
observations. But, in this setting, not only is T fixed, it is likely to be quite small. As such, the 
estimators of the constant terms are not consistent (not because they converge to something 
other than what they are trying to estimate, but because they do not converge at all). The 
estimator of β is a function of the estimators of 𝛽𝑖0, which means that the MLE of β is not 
consistent either. This is the incidental parameters problem (Greene, 2012, p. 721). 
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reported in Table A 9.35 In addition, the maximization of the log-likelihood 
function (LLF) is usually applied when the Probit and logistic regression models 
are used.36  
 
Estimation results of Pooled (𝛽𝑖0 = 𝛽0 ∀ 𝑖) Probit model and of Pooled Logit 
model for overall period (2005-2014), for Pre GFC period (2005-2008), and for 
Post GFC period (2009-2014) are given at Table 10 . Estimation results of random 
effect Probit model and random effect Logit model  are given at Table 12 (𝛽𝑖0 is 
a random bank specific effect).37 The fitted values from regression are the 
estimated probabilities for 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 for each observation i.38   
 
We consider the test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of overall model do 
not differ between different sub-period models: Pre and Post GFC models. 
Economists call the test for such hypothesis the stability Chow test. This test is 
applied respectively for Pooled Probit and Pooled Logit models. Results are Given 
at Table 11. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the logistic (probit) regression 
model applied to each sub-period are identical at any reasonable significance 
level. We conclude that there is no difference between sub-periods and overall 
period results (both models are stable).  
Again, based on random Logit [probit] model, Chow test concludes that no 
difference is present between sub-periods and overall period results (LR chi2(10) 
= - 67.84 with p-value = 1.0) and [LR chi2(10) = - 47.06 with p-value = 1.0]. We 
conclude that there is no difference between sub-periods and overall period 
results. Then, only results for overall period results will be compaired for both 
                                                 
35
 All these results are summed up at the following Table : 
 Z-score CAP ROA ROE CTD LTA LTD NPL CTA 
CAP +         
ROA + + + +        
ROE  − − + +       
CTD + + + +  −      
LTA 
-  −   +      
LTD 
- −  +   ++ +    
NPL   
- - − −  - − - −   
CTA +  + +  + + + +    
LLR  + 
- − - −  - - - − + + + 
DTA      −    
Note : Red sign is for significant coorelations for CB. Black sign is for significant correlation for all banks. Yellow sign is for significant 
correlation for IB. 
36
 Given that both logit and probit are non-linear models, they cannot be estimated by OLS. While 
the parameters could, in principle, be estimated using non-linear least squares (NLS), maximum 
likelihood (ML) is simpler and is invariably used in practice. 
37 Statistical inference should then be based on panel-robust standard errors. Standard errors and t-ratios 
can be calculated and hypothesis tests can be conducted in the usual fashion. 
38
 The slope estimates for the linear probability model can be interpreted as the change in the 
probability that the dependent variable will equal 1 for a one unit change in a given explanatory 
variable, holding the effect of all other explanatory variables fixed. 
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considered models. The choice of one specification Pooled Probit (Logit) rather 
than the other ; Random Probit (Logit) for overall period can not be based on the 
likelihood ratio test,  because of the two likelihoods are not comparable.39 
(Hausman, 1978)’s specification test is a natural one to use here for the choice of 
one specification (Pooled) rather than the other (random effect model) for overall 
period. The choice between Pooled Probit (Logit) model and Random Probit 
(Logit) models for overall period will be based on Hausman test.  (Hausman, 
1978)’s specification test, compares an estimator 𝛽𝑐 that is known to be consistent 
(under Ho and Ha ) with an estimator 𝛽𝑒 that is  efficient under the assumption 
being tested Ho (but inconsistent under Ha).  Under the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity, Ho : 𝜷𝒊𝟎 = 𝜷𝟎 ∀ 𝒊, usual maximum likelihood estimator for pooled 
model is efficient (but inconsistent under alernative). Maximum likelihood 
estimator for random model is consistent under null hypothesis of homogeneity 
and under the alternative but non efficient under null hypothesis of homogeneity. 
 
If null hypothesis of homogeneity is the case, there should be no systematic 
difference between the two estimators. If there exists a systematic difference in 
the estimates, we have reason to doubt the assumptions on homogeneity. The 
Hausman statistic is distributed as χ2 and is computed as 
H = (𝛽𝑐 - 𝛽𝑒)’ (Vc - Ve)-1(𝛽𝑐 - 𝛽𝑒), 
   
where 𝛽𝑐 is the coefficient vector from the consistent estimator, 𝛽𝑒 is the 
coefficient vector from the efficient estimator, Vc is the covariance matrix of the 
consistent estimator, Ve is the covariance matrix of the efficient estimator. 
  
We reject homogeneity hypothesis for lage value of statistic H (p-value is inferior 
than level 𝛼%). Hence, by Hausman test, we test Ho : Pooled Logit model vs 
Ha: Random Logit model. Ho is rejected since H ≡ chi2(9) = 67.78 with p-value 
= 0.000. So Random Logit model for the overall period is significant at 1% 
levels. We test also Ho : Pooled Probit model vs Ha: Random Probit model. Ho 
is not rejected since H ≡  chi2(9) = 10.63 with p-value = 0.3017. So Pooled Probit 
Model for the overall period is significant at 1% levels. Then only Random Logit 
model and Pooled Probit Model results (from respectively Table 12 and 
Table 10) for the overall period will be discussed.  
 
                                                 
39
 Standard errors and t-ratios can be calculated and hypothesis tests can be conducted in the usual 
fashion. 
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Looking at Table 10 (first column),  from the Pooled Probit model results  for the 
whole period (2005–2014), only 7 predictor variables out of 8 are statistically 
significant and so can be used to discriminate between IB and CB.40 These 
variables are: measure of bank stability (Z-score), Capital adequaty ratio (CAP), 
Cash to deposits (CTD), deposits to assets ratio (DTA), Number of years since the 
bank was incorporated (AGE), off-balance sheet items to assets ratio (OBSIA), 
and fixed assets to assets ratio (FAA). Interpretation of the coefficients needs 
slight care. The overall rate of correct classification for this model is estimated to 
be 79.42% (Log-likelihood = - 256.0739), with 91.24% of the normal weight 
group correctly classified (specificity) and only 41.82% of the low weight group 
correctly classified (sensitivity).41 Area under ROC curve = 0.8579 indicates 
acceptable discrimination for the model (see Figure 2).42  
 
The coefficient on Cash to deposits (CTD) is positive and significant at 10% level, 
which indicate that IB are more likely to be more liquid. Hence, the second 
hypothesis, pertaining liquidity, is supported by Pooled Probit model results. The 
positive and significant (at 1% level) coefficient on Capital adequaty ratio (CAP) 
variable confirms that interest-free banks are more likely to be better capitalized 
than their conventional peers, suggesting that IBs are less risky than conventional 
banks. The deposit to assets ratio (DTA) shows negative coefficient and 
significant at 1% level, which indicate that IB are more likely characterized by a 
lower level of deposit to assets ratio compared to CBs and then more capitalized 
and more solvent.43 Hence, the third hypothesis, pertaining risk, is supported by 
the Discrimination results. However, the negative and significant (at 1% level) 
coefficient on Z-score indicate that IB are more likely to have lower stability. 
Hence, the forth hypothesis, pertaining stability, is supported by the 
Discrimination results. Also, the negative coefficient on off-balance sheet items 
to assets ratio (OBSIA) indicates that IBs are more likely to be less involved in 
off-balance sheet activities than CBs. The negative coefficient on fixed assets to 
assets ratio (FAA) indicates that IB are more likely to hold less fixed assets than 
                                                 
40 All considered variable are significant except return on equity (ROE). 
41
 Sensitivity is the fraction of 𝑌it = 1 observations that are correctly classified. Specificity is the percentage of 𝑌it  = 0 
observations that are correctly classified. 
42
 A model with no predictive power would be a 45° line. The greater the predictive power, the more 
bowed the curve, and hence the area beneath the curve is often used as a measure of the predictive 
power. A model with no predictive power has area 0.5; a perfect model has area 1. For a classic text on 
ROC techniques, see (Green & Swets, 1966). 
43
 The negative sign of debt to asset ratio reflects higher capital and lower leverage at IBs. This suggests 
that IBs may be more protected against asset’s losses more than CBs and reflects a better shock 
absorbing capacity. The lower value of this ratio revealsalso that IBs have a greater capacity to sustain 
the assets losses. This result is in accordance with ones reported by (Metwally, 1997), (Samad & Hassan, 
"The performance of Malaysian Islamic Bank During 1984-1997: An Exploratory Study, 2000), 
(Samad, 2004), (Olson & Zoubi, 2008) and in (Toumi, Viviani, & Belkacem, 2010).  
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CB, suggesting lower operating leverage for the former. Finally, results indicate 
that the profitability cannot discriminate between the two groups of banks. Hence, 
this result is not consistent with our first hypothesis. 
 
From the Pooled Probit model results, banks which are less stable, have more 
liquidity, are better capitalized, and are more solvent are more likely to be 
interest-free bank. The reminder of variables is not statistically significant 
according to Pooled probit model. This result reveals that no difference exists 
between the two types of banks with respect to financial characteristics 
represented by ROE. 
 
Marginal effect of predictor variables at the mean of these variables are measured 
and given at Table 13.   
 
Looking at Table 12 (second column),  from Random Logit model for the whole 
period (2005–2014), only 2 predictor variables out of 8 are statistically significant 
and so can be used to discriminate between IB and CB. These variables are: 
measure of bank stability (Z-score) and Number of years since the bank was 
incorporated (AGE). Again, the negative and significant (at 1% level) coefficient 
on Z-score indicate that IB are more likely to be less stable. And then, the forth 
hypothesis, pertaining stability, is supported by the Random Logit model. Also, 
CBs are likely to be older than IBs. 
 
As the binary Random logistic regression, Discriminant function analysis is also 
used to determine which variables are the best predictors to discriminate between 
IBs and CBs. The dependent variable to be predicted is a categorical variable : 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  1 if Bank i is IB and zero if not. 
The independent variables were the 8 defined variables. Table 14 provides the 
standardized regression coefficients in multiple regression. The larger the 
standardized coefficient, the greater is the contribution of the respective variable 
to discriminate between IBs and CBs. AGE was the strongest predictor in 
discriminating the two types of banks while Z-score was the next in importance 
as a predictor. These two ratios are followed respectively by the Capital adequaty 
ratio CAP, Debt to assets DTA, OBSIA, Cash to deposits CTD, and ROE. Like 
the binary logistic regression, the results of the discriminant analysis confirm that 
financial ratios can be used to discriminate between IB and CB. Both the Random 
logistic regression and discriminant analysis suggest that IBs and CBs don’t seem 
to differ much in terms of the profitability ratios ROE. This result is also in line 
with those of previous sections. 
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Table 10: Panel Data Binary Choice Models results: Pooled Probit and Pooled 
Logit model. 
 Overall period Pre GFC Post GFC 
 2005-2014 2005-2008 2009-2014 
Model 
Variables 
Probit    Logit    Probit    Logit    Probit    Logit    
Zscore -.02554499*** -.0432039*** -.02882181*** -.04759096*** -.02449967*** -.04170468*** 
CAP 3.2573606*** 5.5485669*** 3.1720239**  5.4700857**  3.149643**  5.2775427**  
ROE -.15984028    -.2738662    .67972802    1.0777664    -.46484939    -.74067655    
CTD .18915151*   .31926324*   1.5833408    2.5924994    .16899768*   .28819515*   
DTA -3.4049817*** -5.667720*** -3.1422514*** -5.4608451*** -3.8199735*** -6.2131363*** 
AGE -.0413593*** -.0695400*** -.04072201*** -.06958886*** -.04148696*** -.06918171*** 
OBSIA -.54282776**  -.8815858*   -1.0915118**  -1.875337**  -.42215639    -.67369338    
FAA -18.03947*** -31.85208*** -34.621378**  -61.812104**  -13.618308*   -24.105823*   
_cons 1.1233485*** 1.8828708*** 1.2069307**  2.0921645**  1.1454289*** 1.9025512*** 
N 690    690    227    227    463    463    
Khi2 5.8447698        4.370864        1.7119645        
Log-likelihood 
value 
-256.0739 -258.99628 -79.869628 -80.72561 -172.37782 -174.56325 
Pseudo R2 0.3253 0.3176 0.3327 0.3255 0.3358 0.3274 
Hausman :chi2(9) 
Classification 
accuracies 
67.78(0.000) 
79.42% 
 
79.42% 
 
81.06% 
 
81.50% 
 
79.48% 
 
 
79.91% 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: ROC curve for the Pooled model for Overall period 
 
 
Table 11: Chow test results for Pooled models (Likelihood-ratio test). 
Logit model Probit model 
LR chi2(9)  =      7.41 LR chi2(9)  =      7.65 
Prob > chi2 =    0.5940 Prob > chi2 =    0.5695 
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Table 12: Estimated Parameters for Panel Data Binary Choice Models : Random 
Probit and Random Logit. 
 Overall period 
2005-2014 
Pre GFC 
2005-2008 
Post GFC 
2009-2014 
 
Model 
Variables 
Probit     Logit     Probit     Logit     Probit     Logit     
 
                        
Zscore -.06190831**  -.32638282*** -.128897**  -.32502333*** -.1231375*** -.45558583*** 
CAP 8.1578291*   34.514679    19.739536**  16.118575    17.904686*** 39.946671**  
ROE -.30258485    -1.197222    4.3330709    3.0506585    -1.0491346    -1.7945866    
CTD .34013304    1.0758146    3.3624849    7.6644748    .78443762    2.1334912*   
DTA -4.5931341*   -11.731213    -11.765837**  -11.456936    -6.8069156    -19.608087    
AGE -.10421142*** -.61335791*** -.42652857*** -.44225396*** -.2228548*** -.50270902*** 
OBSIA -.5639359    -3.5682963    -2.7282366    -4.965162    -.76205751    -2.0949839    
FAA -30.811834    -119.21984    -285.97632*** -360.10022**  -38.132767    -25.504169    
_cons 1.9995475    10.642075**  7.8199974**  6.9664952    1.4107931    9.0874909*   
/lnsig2u 3.1880642*** 5.7473894*** 4.6576148*** 5.7365676*** 4.3218458*** 5.6393873*** 
Statistics :                         
N 690    690    227    227    463    463      𝜌   
LR test of  𝜌=0 .9603826 394.82    .9896108  417.06   .9906001 88.06    .9894989 86.09    .9868986 252.05    .9884396 255.71    
Log-likelihood -58.664358 -50.468138 -35.838219 -37.679445 -46.35492 -46.707629 
Wald 27.71     73.29         71.73 38.08         57.24 51.29     
Hausman:chi2(9)  10.63(0.3017)     
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
 
Table 13 : Marginal effect at means from Pooled Probit Model.44 
Pooled 
Probit dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z 
     
Zscore -.0039299 .0009202 -4.27 0.000 
CAP .5011189 .1868593 2.68 0.007 
ROE -.0245902 .0455354 -0.54 0.589 
CTD .0290994 .0155744 1.87 0.062 
DTA -.5238292 .116602 -4.49 0.000 
AGE -.0063628 .0010141 -6.27 0.000 
OBSIA -.0835097 .0444168 -1.88 0.060 
FAA -2.775228 .7843334 -3.54 0.000 
 
                                                 
44 Mean for each considered  variable: 
Zscore =     23.08074 
CAP =    .1450023 
ROE =    .1106816 
CTD =    .1791631 
 
AGE =    35.75652 
DTA =    .1143521 
OBSIA =    .2484412 
FAA =  .0221559 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Table 14: Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients. 
Zscore CAP ROE CTD AGE DTA OBSIA FAA 
.519574  .4679121  .0717945  .0845841  .6229849  .3563569  .169839  .0471622  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of IB and CB using a sample of 115 banks (80 
conventional Bank and 35 interest-free banks) from Turky and 6 MENA countries 
over the period 2005–2014. We contribute to Islamic finance empirical literature 
by testing 4 hypotheses examining the profitability, liquidity, credit and 
insolvency risk, and stability of IB and CB.  
 
Three technic are considered to do so. In a first stage, we give an univariate 
analysis based on t-test statistic. In the second stage, we run several linear 
regressions based on OLS method comparing CB (with or without IW) and IB in 
controlling for bank caracteristics, in controlling for cross different size groups, 
in controlling for cross countries, and in controlling in term of maket share. In the 
third stage, a discrimination analysis based on nonlinear panel model for 
Binary Outcome Data such as Probit and logit model and Discriminant 
function analysis is conducted.   
 
This study documents several interesting findings.  
 
First, using univariate analysis, we show that IB and CB behave somewhat 
differently. Mean tests results show that IB are more liquid, more capitalized, less 
stable, less profitable, more solvent, and have more credit risk than their 
conventional peers. In addition, taking account of GFC, IB are found to be more 
profitable pre GFC and more solvent post GFC. 
 
Second, regression analysis, on the other hand show that :  
i) in controlling for bank caracteristic, we find similar results than 
univariate analysis investigation. 
ii) in controlling for Size, Small IB are more profitable, more capitalized, 
and more stable than Small CB (with or without IW).  
iii) in controlling for cross countries, and in accordance with univarite 
results, negative Profitability is driven by Egyptian and Turkish IB, 
Liquidity is driven by Turkish IB, Instability is driven by Egyptian, 
Tunisian, Quatarian and Jordanian IB, while credit risk is driven by all 
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interest-free banks except Tunisian IB which are more profitable. 
Solvency of IB is driven by Turkish, Egyptian, Tunisian, and Bahreïnien 
IB. 
iv) in controlling in term of maket share, and in accordance with univarite 
results, we continue to find that IB are more solvent, are less stable but 
have lower capitalisation than conventional banks in countries and 
years with higher market share of interest-free banks. 
Third, from the nonlinear regression model (Pooled Probit Model) results, 
banks which are less stable, have more liquidity, are better capitalized, and are 
more solvent are more likely to be interest-free bank. From the Random Logit 
model results, banks which are less stable are more likely to be interest-free bank. 
We find also that there is no difference between pre and post the GFC. From 
Discriminant function analysis, AGE was the strongest predictor in 
discriminating the two types of banks while Z-score was the next in importance 
as a predictor. 
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ANNEXE :  
Bank List  
Table A 1 : List of banks covered in this study.45 
Country Conventional Banks Islamic Banks Islamic window or Branch  
1Turky  Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S, 
 T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 
  Akbank T.A.S., 
 Yapi Ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.,  
 Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.,  
 Turkiye Vakiflar Bankas TAO-, 
 Denizbank A.S., 
 Finansbank A.S.,  
 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S.,  
 ING Bank A.S.,  
 HSBC Bank A.S., 
 Sekerbank T.A.S., 
 Alternatifbank A.S., 
 Citibank A.S., 
 Anadolubank A.S., 
 Burgan Bank AS,  
 Tekstilbank-Tekstil Bankasi 
A.S.,  
 Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank 
Asya, 
  Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bank 
Turkowait ,  
 Turkiye Finans Katilim 
Bankasi AS,  
 Albaraka Turk Participation 
Bank  
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S 
(2014) 
2Egypte  Al Watany Bank of Egypt, 
  Arab African International 
Bank, 
 Arab International Bank, 
 Bank Audi SAE,  
 Bank of Alexandria,  
 Banque du Caire SAE, 
 Banque Misr SAE, 
 Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E., 
 BNP Paribas SAE, 
 Commercial Internt Bank 
(Egypt),  
 Credit Agricole Egypt, 
 HSBC Bank Egypt S A E,  
 Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE,  
 Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt,  
 Al Watany Bank of 
Egypt, 
 Banque Misr SAE 
 National Bank of Egypt,  
 
                                                 
45 Source : Islamic financial instituitions, Global investment and Business Center , USA 2009 
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 National Bank of Egypt,  
 Société Arabe Intern de 
Banque,  
 Suez Canal Bank,  
3Tunisia  Banque Internt Arabe Tunisi,  
 Banque Nationale Agricole,  
 Société Tunisienne de Bank,  
 Amen Bank,  
 Banque de l'Habitat, Attijari 
Bank,  
 Arab Tunisian Bank,  
 Banque de Tunisie,  
 Union Internl de Banque,  
 Union Bancaire  Comrce et 
l'Industrie, 
 North Africa International Bank 
– NAIB,  
 Arab Banking Corporation – 
Tunisie,  
 Alubaf International Bank, 
 Banque Franco-Tunisienne,  
 Ahli United Bank BSC 
 Albaraka Bank Tunisia,  
 Banque Zitouna 
 
4Bahreïn  Arab Banking Corporation BSC, 
 BBK B.S.C, 
 BMI Bank BSC,  
 Future Bank B.S.C., 
 Gulf International Bank BSC,  
 National Bank of Bahrain,  
 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
 Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC, 
 Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C,  
 First energy bank, 
 International Investment 
Bank, 
 Kuwait Finance House, 
 Albaraka Banking Group 
B.S.C.,  
 ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.),  
 Citi Islamic Investment Bank,  
 Gulf Finance House BSC,  
 Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C.,  
 Khaleeji Commercial Bank, 
 Elaf Bank,  
 Investors Bank BSC,  
 Arcapita Bank B.S.C., 
 Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-
VCBank,  
 Seera Investment Bank BSC,  
 Arab Banking 
Corporation BSC, 
 BBK B.S.C, 
 BMI Bank BSC,  
 Gulf International Bank 
BSC,  
 
5UAE  Arab Bank for Investment & 
Foreign, 
 Bank of Sharjah,  
 Commercial Bank International 
P.S.C,  
 Emirates NBD PJSC,  
 First Gulf Bank, 
 Union National Bank,  
 Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC, 
 Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC,  
 Tamweel PJSC,  
 Sharjah Islamic Bank,  
 Arab Bank for 
Investment & Foreign, 
 
 First Gulf Bank, 
 Mashreqbank, 
 National Bank of 
UmmAl-Qaiwain,  
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 National Bank of Fujairah,  
 National Bank of Abu Dhabi,  
 Mashreqbank,  
 Ahli Bank QSC,  
 National Bank of Umm Al-
Qaiwain 
 Commercial Bank 
International P.S.C  
 Emirates NBD PJSC 
 Union National Bank,46  
 National Bank of 
Fujairah,  
 
 National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi 
 
6Qatar  Al Khalij Commercial Bank, 
 Commercial Bank of Qatar, 
 Doha Bank,  
 International Bank of Qatar 
Q.S.C.,  
 Qatar National Bank,  
 Arab Bank Group  
outlet47 
 Barwa Bank,  
 Qatar International Islamic 
Bank,  
 Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ,  
 Al Khalij Commercial 
Bank 
 Doha Bank,  
 Qatar National Bank, 
 Arab Bank Group48 
7Jordan  Arab Bank Plc ,  
 Arab Banking Corporation 
Jordan ,  
 Bank of Jordan Plc , 
 Cairo Amman Bank , 
 Capital Bank of Jordan ,  
 Housing Bank for Trade & 
Finance  
 Jordan Ahli Bank Plc ,  
 Jordan Commercial Bank , 
 Jordan Kuwait Bank , 
 Société général de 
Banque-Jordanie,  
 Islamic International Arab 
Bank,  
 Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank, 
 Jordan Islamic Bank 
 Arab Banking 
Corporation 
 Cairo Amman Bank , 
 Société général de 
Banque-Jordanie, 
 Jordan Kuwait Bank 
 
Empirical Review 
 
Table A 2 : Some selected papers and their main findings, including whether they examined 
the effects of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
AUTHOR(S)  
 
TOPIC(S)  
 
Sample # Banks FINDING(S)  
 
GFC 
(Čihák & Hesse, 
2010))  
 
Stability 
with Z-score  
 
1993–2004  
19 countrie  
474 banks 
(77 IB)  
 
(1) overall, Islamic 
banks (IBs) more stable 
NO 
                                                 
 
 
47 (Combined) has four branches in Qatar, along with an Islamic banking 
48 merged with Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank in 2019 
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than conventional banks 
(CBs)  
(2) small IBs more 
stable than small CBs  
(3) large CBs tend to be 
more stable than large 
IBs; and  
(4) small IBs more 
stable than large IBs.  
(Beck, Demirguc 
-Kunt, & 
Merrouche, 
Islamic vs. 
conventional 
banking: business 
model, efficiency 
and stability, 
2013)  
 
Efficiency 
and stability 
with Z-score 
and liquidity 
ratio  
 
1995–2009  
22 
countries 
with dual 
banking 
systems  
510 banks 
(88 IB)  
 
IBs significantly less 
stable than CBs using Z-
score but not different in 
terms of liquidity. 
During the GFC, there 
were no significant 
differences.  
 
 
YES 
(Bourkhis & 
Nabi, 2013)  
 
Stability 
with Z-score  
 
1998–2009  
16 
countries  
68 banks (34 
IB)  
 
Overall, IBs more stable 
than conventional 
banks, but no significant 
difference between IBs 
and CBs in terms of the 
effect of the GFC on 
banking soundness  
 
YES 
(Rajhi & 
Hassairi, 2013)  
 
Stability 
with Z-score  
 
2000–2008  
16 
countries  
557 (90 IB)  
 
IBs have higher stability 
than CBs.  
Credit risk and income 
diversity are the most 
common determinants 
of insolvency for IBs.  
NO 
(Abedifar, 
Molyneux, & 
Tarazi, 2013)  
 
Credit risk 
with the ratio 
of loan loss 
reserves to 
gross loans, 
and 
insolvency 
risk with Z-
score  
 
1999–2009  
24 
countries  
553 banks 
(118 IB)  
 
Small IBs more stable 
than small CBs.  
Large IBs exhibit lower 
stability than large CBs.  
Credit risk of IBs is less 
sensitive to interest 
rates.  
IBs had lower credit risk 
than CBs prior and 
during the GFC  
YES 
(Ben Khediri, 
Charfeddined, & 
Ben Youssef, 
2015) 
 
4 GCC 
countries.49 
2003-2010 
43 
conventional 
banks and 18  
Islamic 
banks  
 
Islamic banks are on 
average less involved in 
off-balance sheet 
activities and have more 
operating leverage than 
their conventional peers. 
The two types of banks 
may be differentiated in 
terms of credit and 
YES 
                                                 
49
 (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) 
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insolvency risk, 
operating leverage and 
off-balance sheet 
activities, but not in 
terms of profitability 
and liquidity. 
GFC has a time shifted 
negative impact on the 
profitability for both 
Islamic and 
conventional banks.50 
(Kabir, 
Worthington, & 
Gupta, 2015)  
 
Credit risk 
wih 
accounting 
based as well 
as market 
based  
 
2000 -2012  
13 
countries  
193 banks  
(37 IB)  
Islamic banks have 
lower credit risk using 
market-based measures 
stability measure. 
Islamic banks have 
higher credit risk using 
accounting-based credit 
risk measures. During 
GFC, no significant 
difference in Islamic 
and conventional bank 
credit risk  
 
YES 
(Louhichi & 
Boujelbene, 
2016) 
Credit risk 10 OIC 
countries51 
2005 -2012 
87 
conventional 
bank and 30 
islamic bank. 
 
Results support the “bad 
management” 
hypothesis for 
conventional banks. 
Results support the 
moral hazard and 
skimping hypotheses for 
both banks‟ type. 
Islamic banks behave 
differently to credit 
risk dilemma. 
 
NO 
(Alqahtani, 
Mayes, & 
Brown, 2016) 
Stability 
with Z-score 
and DD52 
 
2000-2013 
six 
economies 
of GCC 
region53 
76 banks 
(24) 
Islamic banks are more 
stable when they 
operate at a small scale. 
Small Islamic banks 
demonstrated a 
relatively better 
handling of the 
economy downturn than 
large Islamic banks. 
YES 
(Mansor, Aun, & 
Rizvi, 2017) 
Stability 
with Z-score 
13 
countries.54  
2000-2014 
45 Islamic 
banks 
Larger Islamic banks 
are more stable at least 
NO 
                                                 
50 Global financial crisis :GFC. 
51 (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)   
52 Distance to Default. 
53
 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. 
54
 (Bangladesh, Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates). 
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and NZ-
score. 
when they surpass a 
certain threshold size. 
 
(Miah & Uddin, 
2017) 
Stability GCC 
2005-2014 
48 
conventional 
banks and 28 
Islamic 
banks 
Conventional banks are 
more efficient in 
managing cost. 
Islamic banks are more 
solid in terms of short-
term solvency but no 
such difference exists as 
far as the long-term 
stability is concerned. 
Highly capitalized 
banks are more stable. 
 
NO 
 
Definitions of Islamic financial instruments  
Mudaraba 
This product is used to finance a borrower (entrepreneur) who has ideas and 
expertise to use the funds in productive activities. The bank provides the finances 
and the business provides the labor. Profit is shared between the two parties based 
on an agreed upon ratio. The bank is a passive partner. If any loss is occurred, it 
is borne by the bank provided if there is no intent of the Mudarib of the loss 
(Gunputh, 2014). 
Musharaka  
It is a partnership contract between the bank and the client in which both the 
partners invest their capital in a project in a proportion. An Islamic bank provides 
part of the equity plus working capital for a specific project and shares in profits 
and/or losses. Specifications are provided by the purchaser. They share profit or 
loss in a way that the loss is shared between the partners in the proportion they 
invested their capital, but the profit is shared in a predetermined proportion with 
mutual consensus (Mehtab, Zaheer, & Ali, 2015). This product is generally used 
in home loans (for construction and renovation purposes).  
Murabaha 
An Islamic bank buys an asset on behalf of its client and then sells the same asset 
to its client after adding a mark-up to the purchase price. This product is used to 
finance the businesses. It is a contract to sell the goods with a mark-up profit on 
the cost of the goods. The client instructs the bank to purchase the goods from a 
third party. The bank then sells the goods to the client on the price that includes 
cost plus the profit. This product is also used to finance the  business (Shahid, 
Hassan, & Rizwan, 2015). 
Ijara 
The Islamic bank purchases a piece of equipment selected by the entrepreneur and 
then leases it back to him; he pays a fixed fee. This product is mostly used for the 
purchase of vehicles like cars, delivery vans, etc. the bank purchases the vehicle 
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for the client and the client pays monthly rentals.When the cost of the vehicle plus 
the profit amount is paid by the client, the ownership is transferred to the client 
(Chhapra, Ahmed, Rehan, & Hussain, 2018). 
Ijara wa iktina 
The transaction resembles Ijara, except that the client is committed to purchase 
the equipment at the end of the rental period (Olson & Zoubi, 2008). 
Bai al salam 
A contract for sale of goods where the price is paid in advance and the goods are 
delivered in the future. 
Istisna 
A contract to acquire goods on behalf of a third party. The price is paid to the 
manufacturer in advance and the goods are produced and delivered at a later date. 
Appendice A 
Data Analysis Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Table A 3: Descriptive statistics of variables (average values) 
       
  
Conventional 
banks*   
Islamic 
banks  
Variable N.Obs Mean Std_Dev N.Obs Mean Std_Dev 
Zscore 714 24,56965 20,20792 282 12,83398 11,36676 
CAP 722 0,1258643 0,0934357 283 0,3113774 0,2994792 
ROA 717 0,0148787 0,0321819 285 0,0137452 0,1353901 
ROE 713 0,1276067 0,2256616 282 0,0607897 0,2953963 
CTA 719 0,071153 0,0901989 283 0,0648099 0,0787702 
CTD 647 0,130259 0,5567002 208 0,4609902 2,580818 
NPL 486 0,071239 0,1148336 193 0,0730088 0,1544408 
LLR 572 0,0660568 0,085119 231 0,0602344 0,117228 
LTA 642 0,5025245 0,3055482 265 0,4738117 0,3211485 
LTD 631 0,7973383 0,3891334 238 0,9866655 1,058071 
DTA 711 0,1281966 0,1852995 259 0,0895002 0,1140078 
FAA 708 0,0252381 0,2804092 281 0,0151735 0,0602311 
OBSIA 629 0,2521895 0,2173852 266 0,1940171 0,2634909 
Size 723 3,119207 1,540432 283 3,090518 1,457905 
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Regression analysis outputs 
IB vs CB 
Table A 4 : Comparing IB and CB (without islamic windows), Controlling for 
bank caracteristics (Equation (1)). 
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA 
    
Return on 
equity ROE 
Cash to assets 
CTA     
Cash to deposits 
CTD 
Loans to assets 
LTA     
Loans to 
deposits  
LTD     
IB -.00131809    -.0274705    -.00486521    .39935675*  .00089511    .27799425**  
CB .00083411    .00860275    -.02132765**  .10945292   -.09782926**  .04852452    
D2008 .02268643    -.12601063*** .03917042    2.4381321   -.12495226**  -.11758747    
AGE .0001232*   .00061288**  -.00014746    .00014839   -.00028675    -.0018281**  
Size -.01095397**  .00118162    .00312913    -.10204495   .00511793    .00389605    
Growth -.00368288    .00915229    -.00901799    .10203085   -.00411829    .12981585    
FAA -.0072477    -.00874076    -.00441178**  -.0225279   -.32867001    5.3832895**  
OBSIA -.00739299    -.01429781    -.00996845    .06857875   .08811055**  .02673856    
_cons .02717594*** .15167431*** .05682289*** -.03694218   .64789176*** .88942532*** 
N 718    715    723    622   595    570    
R2 .12773841    .37682835    .24394082    .11381136   .59224339    .21175537    
       
 
 
Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR     
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL     
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets  
DTA     
Zscore    
IB -.01010428    -.03168178**  .07838778*** -.05127249*** -4.8512003**  
CB -.00409616    -.02141421**  .02481937*** .03633445**  4.263354*   
D2008 -.03784701    -.23981646**  .10067978    .28875856**  47.188523**  
AGE -.00042517*** -.00045941**  .00008391    -.00027035    .02520304    
Size .00716095**  .00004928    -.05265779*** -.02839877*** 2.9479675*** 
Growth -.00480142    .00513505    .02831289    .02037432    4.0281364    
FAA .32566984    .77580376    .00398767    -.00770816**  1.8350413*** 
OBSIA -.00093942    -.04816153**  -.03742087    .00444747    1.8542205    
Trend .00004415    .00028337*** .0001222    -.00026349**  -.03225342**  
_cons .03731369**  .05092613*   .12425668*** .09626793*** 13.699881*** 
N 544    482    721    698    716    
R2 .38841486    .34850992    .37948952    .26459964    .29445683    
      
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
 
Size case 
 
 Table A 5 : Comparing Large IB, Large CB with islamic windows, and Large 
conventional banks (Equation (2)). 
 Profitability Liquidity Credit risk 
Variable Return on assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to assets 
LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
*Large IB -.00723235    -.05829901*   -.00372531    -.30334947   -.09886059*** -.01577765    
*Large CB 
with I W 
-.00225805    -.02857776**  -.01935719**  .34616984** -.06468014*   .12544312*** 
*Large  CB -.0004109    .05321622**  .0001226    -.15102502   -.162649*** -.31270577*** 
D2008 -.01303622*** -.03840177*** .01849386*** .22684579** .05762941*** -.00064149    
Trend             .00059757**         
_cons .0243485*** .1278499*** .05338017*** -.15588034   .4966474*** .94245318*** 
N 1002    995    1002    855   907    869    
R2 .00771978    .02323118    .01780355    .02537746   .07069984    .03919808    
F 3.8940209    6.2680002    4.567443    2.4400927   18.339277    14.765331    
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 Reglementary risk                     Credit risk STABILITY Insolvency 
Variable Capital 
adequaty ratio  
CAP    
Loans loss 
reserves to 
gross loans  
LLR    
Non-
performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL    
Zscore    Debt to assets 
DTA    
*Large IB -.04493257**  -.0030305    -.02667033    -6.5146272*** -.01997406    
*Large CB 
with I W 
.13694217*** .00920558    .02871305**  -2.6226973    -.01103017    
*Large CB -.10452904*** .00465215    -.02700856**  14.99668*** .02146158    
D2008 .02489974**  .01336193**  .0260175*** -1.3097236    -.00401132    
Trend .0001623*** -.00002753*** .00002403**  .0073956*** .00003058**  
_cons .11791965*** .07282696*** .05496213*** 15.35307*** .09943672*** 
N 1005    803    679    996    970    
R2 .11376794    .01904817    .01766274    .14320072    .00942074    
F 24.571359    4.9434367    2.0606064    28.15765    2.5249349    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
Cross country 
 
Table A 6: Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing for cross-country 
variation ; Equation(3).55 
 Profitability   Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA 
    
Return on 
equity ROE 
Cash to assets 
CTA       
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
   
Loans to 
assets LTA 
    
Loans to 
deposits  
LTD     
IB*Country                        
1 Turky -.01085864*   .01161412    .04922647*** -.07709583   .10796479*** -.217707*** 
2 Egypt -.01318139*** -.0160245    -.00165703    .00225581   .03658055    .10403444**  
3 Tunisia .00903234**  -.27294949    .00371337    -.00547917   -.13524802**  -.13616107    
4 Bahrain -.00016239    -.06582343    -.00514191    .21747514   .04077061    .05020969    
5 UAE .00567938    -.0065544    .0095595    -.01920457   .07053243    .37331453*   
6 Quatar .00262085    -.01731075    -.02375965**  .37175875   .06689766**  .27435259*   
7 Jordan .00312645    .02411544    .0134236    2.4677476   .1106443*** 1.8378451**  
D2008 .02206542    -.12667874*** .0458446*   2.3753649   -.09288863*   -.06921298    
AGE .00011409*   .0006511**  -.00012144    .0010766   -.00029192    -.00165695*** 
Size -.01100503**  .00115967    .00404676    -.11228195   .00882058    -.01037939    
Growth -.00385804    .00843426    -.01054619    .12078432   -.01341804    .13585113    
FAA -.00743362    -.00820469    -.00503729*** -.02628621   -.21255325    5.8195402*** 
OBSIA -.00493326    -.03095817    -.01601574    .17756814   .10494953*** .18769266    
_cons .02826042*** .16116496*** .0330497**  .03624224   .5379753*** .91566152*** 
N 718    715    723    622   595    570    
R2 .12968328    .38733703    .24857186    .15179409   .58727804    .33634261    
Table 7 (suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR     
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL     
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA       
Zscore    
IB*Country                     
1 Turky -.0171253*** -.01475118    -.05189546*** -.09795127*** -1.6356474    
2 Egypt .10167456**  .19444614**  -.0475668*** -.03411482**  -6.533131**  
3 Tunisia -.04051233    -.18797017*** -.01224329    -.10146369*** -29.707037*** 
4 Bahrain -.04301231*** -.06265221*** .27851912*** -.10873746*** -4.3979103    
5 UAE -.00895559    -.02868109**  .01797368    .00579515    -.51430417    
6 Quatar -.00273575    -.02374091**  .02860464**  -.13281333*** -20.105154*** 
7 Jordan -.02814794*** .04748187    .08070704    -.01614552    -10.01156*** 
D2008 .00048101    -.12539114    .2776818**  .29885507**  58.512291*** 
                                                 
55 Country-year-fixed effects are not reported in this table. 
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AGE -.00044406*** -.0004751**  -.00012969    -.00030349    .01821726    
Size .00616054**  -.00103783    -.05473244*** -.0301909*** 2.7776759*** 
Growth -.00332748    .00495965    .02971374    .02508149    4.4445088    
FAA .26605557    .60748673    .00233864    -.00563511    1.9976982*** 
OBSIA .00541596    -.0422643*   .01004406    .00458119    -.0488952    
Trend 8.938e-06    .00017638**  -.00006784    -.00028165**  -.04450324*** 
_cons .0376486*** .0425092*   .16920691*** .13794154*** 19.664365*** 
N 544    482    721    698    716    
R2 .45200615    .41390478    .47245168    .27822532    .31800541    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
 
Market shares 
Table A 7  Comparing Islamic and conventional banks – controlling for market 
shares. 
Panel A : 
Equation(4) 
 Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA       
Return on 
equity ROE 
   
Cash to assets 
CTA     
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD 
Loans to 
assets 
LTA    
Loans to 
deposits  
LTD    
IB .00472551    -.04516391*   -.00647867    .47809767* .04664336**  .18681026*   
ShareIB -.08041396    -.16845447    .20765798*** -2.228413  -.19288695    .38411658    
D2008 -.00740972*   -.11050394*** .0666991*** 2.126281  -.068322    -.19106492*   
Bank level 
controls 
No No No No No No 
_cons .01832499*** .17050609*** .01698266*** -.00852361  .51726665*** .87445171*** 
N 998    994    1002    854  820    784    
R2 .09247766    .27595341    .20620806    .10690814  .49435269    .15289427    
F 4.4778103    4.3284387    10.95548    .  .    11.614263    
Panel A 
(Suite) 
 Credit risk Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency  
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL     
Capital 
adequaty ratio  
CAP       
Debt to assets 
DTA      
Zscore    
IB -.00204889    .00661781    .16225613*** -.09324424*** -4.2738217*** 
ShareIB .05606239    -.21562191**  -1.2148434*** -.13149506    -49.400001*** 
D2008 -.0448917    -.20285754*   -.35824212*** -.37592779*   78.176837*** 
Bank level controls No No No No No 
Trend .00006338    .00024274**  .00043403*** .00029774    -.05781326*** 
_cons .03395612*   .02052063    .05593597*** .06433303**  26.139141*** 
N 720    613    1004    970    996    
R2 .21985581    .25190219    .37160166    .14500489    .23535374    
F .    .    6.6029235    11.601783    8.5684394    
 
Panel B : 
Equation(5) 
 Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA       
Return on 
equity  
ROE     
Cash to 
assets CTA 
    
Cash to 
deposits  
CTD 
Loans to 
assets 
LTA       
Loans to 
deposits  
LTD     𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵 -.04471589    -.13014302    .1660079**  .09464414    -.36752792    .30725938    𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐶𝐵 .02339405    .66404933    -.09840285    .13813993    -.47057463*** -1.0137188*** 
Size -.00276544    -.00763345    .00588821**  -.11315543**  .04130944*** .05023796**  
AGE -.00008039    .00068379**  -7.421e-06    -.00115754    -.00106262*** -.00325064*** 
Growth -.01025769    -.04711955    -.0007459    .10814698    .00426771    .11702422    
D2008 .00024387    -.122041**  .0403241*   2.3939621    -.22092181*** -.38062779*** 
_cons .02382112*** .12952622*** .02887519*** .18297494    .60886177*** 1.1068725*** 
N 881    877    885    749    709    680    
R2 .08769795    .35417866    .22747985    .09837896    .52239596    .15316326    
Panel B 
(Suite) 
 Credit risk Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency  
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Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans LR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans NPL     
Capital 
adequaty ratio 
CAP       
Debt to assets 
DTA       
Zscore    𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵 -.01303533    -.16841351**  -.08642947    -.30447872*** -65.459708*** 𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐶𝐵 -.05553694    -.05844042    .46704904*** .9718865**  68.125234*** 
Size .00067132    -.00445393    -.06963587*** -.0203697**  1.5207558**  
AGE -.00061941*** -.00068404*** -.0007706**  .00028765    -.01893517    
Growth .01024335    .03047509**  -.00523836    .03000435    -2.2807655    
D2008 .05495926    -.02161826    -.17544307    -.15933235    64.841155*** 
Trend -.0000256    .00009208    .00043909*** .00013512    -.04927048*** 
_cons .05881233*** .05184742**  .13550236*** .00660804    19.97159*** 
N 622    539    886    856    879    
R2 .23228855    .27987779    .38125708    .21791733    .2896816    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
Unit root tests and order of integration 
Table A 8: Unit root test results: All Banks. 
 
 Deterministc trend Test statistic and instability  Conclusion 
 constant trend Possible dates 
of change 
ADF PP  
Z-score    2009→2012 0.0954       
0.5380 
-2.77280  0.0028 I(0) 
NPL    2008→2012 -0.2892 
(0.3862) 
0.2892       
 0.3862 
I(1) 
LLR 
   2008-2012 1.9779       
0.9760 
-1.28917  0.0987 I(1) 
DTA 
   2012 0.6079       
(0.728) 
0.6079       (0.7284) I(1) 
OBSIA 
   2011-2012 1.2010       
0.8851 
1.2010       
 0.8851 
I(1) 
Size 
   2008→2012 0.8854       
(0.8120) 
0.8854    
( 0.8120) 
I(1) 
CAP 
   2011 2.2973       
0.9892 
0.05044   
0.5201 
I(1)  
ROE    2008→2011 -6.9588       
(0.0000) 
-6.9588       (0.0000) I(0) 
ROA    2008-2009 -9.2279       
0.0000 
-9.2279       0.0000 I(0) 
CTA    2009, 2013 -4.2186       
0.0000 
-4.8592       0.0000 I(0)  
LTA    2011-2012 -1.9821       
0.0237 
-6.1035       0.0000 I(0) 
LTD    2011 -9.6266       
0.0000 
-6.3186       0.0000 I(0) 
CTD 
   2008-2009 -5.3393       
(0.0000) 
-5.3393       (0.0000) I(0) 
FAA 
    2011 -2.1158       
0.0172 
-2.1158       0.0172 I(0) 
Note : p-value is given for  Inverse Normal  Z –test Fisher-type unit-root test based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.  
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Correlation matrix 
Table A 9: correlation matrices : All Banks 
 
 
Zscore NPL CAP ROA ROE CTD CTA LLR LTA LTD OBSIA FAA 
Zscore 1.0000             
NPL -0.0457 1.0000            
 
0.2610            
CAP 0.0005 0.0434 1.0000           
 
0.9884 0.2837           
ROA 0.0847* -0.0059 0.0490 1.0000          
 
0.0075 0.8833 0.1225          
ROE 0.0626* -0.0934* -0.1292* 0.4686* 1.0000         
 
0.0484 0.0214 0.0000 0.0000         
CTD 0.0129 0.0358 0.2684* -0.0244 -0.0406 1.0000        
 
0.7075 0.4063 0.0000 0.4776 0.2370        
CTA 0.0669* -0.0275 -0.1075* 0.0696* 0.0558 0.1903* 1.0000       
 
0.0350 0.4978 0.0007 0.0280 0.0791 0.0000       
LLR -0.0698 0.7875* -0.0412 -0.0110 -0.1039* -0.0258 -0.0683  1.0000      
 
0.0623 0.0000 0.2698 0.7682 0.0055 0.5173 0.0673      
LTA -0.0687* -0.0702 -0.0931* 0.0650 0.0051 -0.0160 -0.0281  -0.0964* 1.0000     
 
0.0495 0.0741 0.0076 0.0630 0.8834 0.6671 0.4226 0.0072     
LTD -0.0945* -0.0317 0.0324 0.0662 -0.0201 0.0434 -0.0971* -0.0596 0.5028* 1.0000    
 
0.0082 0.4254 0.3645 0.0641 0.5751 0.2556 0.0066 0.1021 0.0000    
OBSIA -0.0460 -0.1215* -0.1728* -0.0114 0.0462 0.0022 0.0163  -0.1056* 0.1348* 0.1331* 1.0000   
 
0.1894 0.0030 0.0000 0.7443 0.1873 0.9538 0.6401 0.0055 0.0002 0.0003   
FAA 0.0098 0.2660* 0.0138 -0.0194 -0.0079 -0.0059 -0.0077  0.2958* -0.0890* -0.0205 -0.0272 1.0000  
 0.7684 0.0000 0.6770 0.5584 0.8129 0.8684 0.8172 0.0000 0.0102 0.5656 0.4192   
Note : Empirical correlation and p-value.
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Appedice B : Applicability conditions for U R Tests  
 
Panel-data model with autoregressive components is ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛾𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑗∆ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑗=1 , 
 
where  𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑊𝑁. 𝜙𝑖 = 𝜙 for LLC, HT and Breitung tests. 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛾𝑖 represents panel-specific means 
and linear time trends if  𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛾𝑖= (1,  t) and if  𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛾𝑖 = 1, it represents panel-specific means (fixed 
effects). 
Panel unit-root tests are used to test the null hypothesis H0 : 𝜙𝑖 = 0 for all i versus the alternative 
Ha : 𝜙𝑖 < 0.56 Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is nonstationary. 
HT, LLC, and Breitung tests make the simplifying assumption that all panels share the same 
autoregressive parameter so that 𝜙𝑖 = 𝜙 for all i.57 
The Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) (2003) test relaxes the assumption of a common 𝜙 and instead 
allows each panel autoregressive parameter to be panel specific (to have its own 𝜙𝑖).  Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is independently distributed normal for all i and t, and they 
allow 𝜀𝑖𝑡 to have heterogeneous variances 𝜎𝑖2 across panels. 
PP - Choi Z-stat or ADF - Choi Z-stat tests conduct unit-root tests for each panel 
individually, and then combine the p-values from these tests to produce an overall test. Fisher 
type test combines p-values using the inverse chi-squared, inverse-normal, and inverse-logit 
transformations. Null Hypothesis is Unit root (individual unit root process). Choi’s (2001) 
simulation results suggest that the inverse normal Z statistic offers the best trade-off 
between size and power. These tests assume that T tends to infinity.  If the number of panels, 
N, is fixed, then these tests are consistent against the alternative that at least one panel is 
stationary.  
For Hadri Z-stat, null hypothesis is Stationarity. Hadri tests are appropriate for panel 
datasets in which T is large and N is moderate.  Asymptotically, the Hadri LM test is justified 
as T →∞ followed by N →∞. The Hadri LM test requires that the panels be strongly balanced 
Depending on the considered test, alternative Ha may hold, for one i, a fraction of all i or all i.58 
                                                 
56A major limitation of the LLC, HT, and Breitung tests is the assumption that all panels have 
the same value of 𝜙=𝜙𝑖 for all i. For HT,  𝜀𝑖𝑡is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) normal with constant variance across panels. Breiyung test assumes that the 
error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is uncorrelated across both i and t. 
HT test has favorable size and power properties for N greater than 25. HT (1999) derived a 
unit-root test that assumes that the time dimension, T, is fixed. Breitung test has good power 
even with small datasets (N = 25, T = 25). 
57
 The inclusion of a fixed-effect term in a dynamic model causes the OLS estimate of 𝜙  to be 
biased toward zero. The LLC method produces a bias-adjusted t statistic that has an 
asymptotically normal distribution. LLC (2002) recommend using their test with panels of 
“moderate” size, which they describe as having between 10 and 250 panels and 25 to 250 
observations per panel. 
58
 The alternative hypothesis is that there is a fraction of panels are stationary.  Specifically, if 
we let N1 denote the number of stationary panels, then the fraction N1/N tends to a nonzero 
fraction as N tends to infinity.  This allows some (but not all) of the panels to possess unit roots 
under the alternative hypothesis. 
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Except for the Fisher tests, all the tests require that there be no gaps in any panel’s series.  
 
Table B 1: Differences in applicability conditions among the various unit root tests.  
Test 𝒛′𝒊𝒕𝜸𝒊 Sample size 𝝓𝒊 under Ha Panel Data 
LLC noconstant 
 
√𝑁! 0 common balanced 
LLC  √𝑁! 0 common balanced 
LLC trend √𝑁! 0 common balanced 
HT noconstant 
 
! 1, fixed common balanced 
HT  ! 1, fixed common balanced 
HT trend ! 1, fixed common balanced 
Breitung noconstant 
 
() !seq 1 common balanced 
Breitung  () !seq 1 common balanced 
Breitung trend () !seq 1 common balanced 
IPS trend ! 1, fixed 
or 
and fixed 
panel-specific unbalanced 
IPS Lag() () !seq 1 panel-specific unbalanced 
IPS Lag(), trend () !seq 1 panel-specific unbalanced 
Fisher type  ! 1, finite 
or infinite 
panel-specific unbalanced 
Hadri LM  () !seq 1 (not applicable) balanced 
Hadri LM trend () !seq 1 (not applicable) balanced 
 
In this paper, since considered panel data are balanced with fixed T (T=10) and fixed N=115 
(large number of banks), and some gaps, Fisher type-test (PP - Choi Z-stat or ADF - Choi 
Z-stat) will be used for accurate results of panel unit root test.  
 
 
